特稿：中国政改如果失败，中美或开战
多维社记者林桂明编译报导/中国的改革者们在寻求实行与经济惊人成就相对应的渐进式政治改革，如果他们失败了，也许就是战争……
这是英国卫报的专栏作家、历史学家蒂莫西•加顿•阿什（Timothy Garton Ash）从上海发出的一篇题为“中国的经济成功也许很快会给其自身和我们带来麻烦”（China's economic success may soon bring trouble.It would be ours too）的文章中提出的观点。
该文章说，眼下的中国人，面对世界其他地区碰到的麻烦，隐然表现出的，是一种可以感觉到的自我陶醉感和盛气凌人态，不管是对孟买的恐怖袭击还是对美国和欧洲的经济衰退，都是如此。例如一位官方的理论家在总结印度孟买惨案时的结论就是：如果民主带来的就是这些东西，我们最好还是不要它。还有，就是他们认为，如果陷在自做自受的金融危机中的西方，想要中国来解救，就应当给中国在国际机构里享有更大的权力。
总之，中国人充满了那种西方“得靠中国支撑”的心理，同时混杂着“我们这里不会发生那种事”的自我感觉。实际上，中国人说这种话可能是为时太早了。但如果真是这样的话，那将会是西方的麻烦事，也是中国的麻烦事。
要描述中国过去30年的经济发展，用“太令人惊诧”是很合适的。自从邓小平发动改革开放之后，中国经济的年平均增长率都在9％以上。就像笔者在上海商业区所见，高楼林立，华灯璀灿，相形之下，更显出美国都市的一片经济萧杀。
穿过黄浦江，超级品牌中心的正大广场繁华喧嚣，显示着中国人的消费荣景。中国的年轻人拎着最时髦的西方名牌的购物袋，在星巴克咖啡店里品咖啡。是啊，尽管像上海这样的都市，还只是中国辽阔的贫困农村海洋包围的孤岛而已，但是中国的经济增长同时也让也许是3亿多人脱了贫。《经济学家》姐妹刊物《经济学人智库》（Economist Intelligence Unit）的一份报告说，按照这个势头发展下去，到2020年，中国经济的规模就会和美国和欧盟的不相上下了。当然这只是一种可能性。
著名的北京大学新的管理学院院长、崇尚自由市场的学者张维迎先生断言说，经过了这30年，中国的经济改革已基本完成。诚然，经济的要害部门依然由大型国有企业控制，但是随着他们全球各地的股市上市，获得占少数的私人参股，和面临市场压力，这些公司也越来越像追求价值最大化的私人公司。虽然，他们的前面还有很长的路要走，但前进的方向是清晰的。
中国今后30年所需要的，在张维迎看来，是进行相应的政治改革，从建立法治开始。在过去的半个月里，这样的类似说法，在一些敏感地方，人们已经吃惊地听到很多次了。例如，在专门从事收集和翻译从马克思、毛泽东到胡锦涛的各种官方著作和声明的中共中央编译局，一间简朴的办公室里，副主任俞可平，这位党内著名的政治学家和改派认为，中国正在从人治走向法治。他认为，中国历史几千年来，普通老百姓第一次获得了法律上的权利，可以来反对政府当局。即使是党和国家高层领导人也应当遵守法律。中国也需要更透明、更廉洁的政府；政府官员必须更有效地解决民众的需求，要实行“一次性解决问题”的服务；在地方政府还是共产党内要有更多的民主。也许列宁同志在他的坟墓里听到这个话都会气得躺不住了。
蒂莫西写道，不过，在中国的司法实践是远远落后于这一理论的。任何一个中国律师都可以告诉你，中国离一个独立的司法系统还远着呢。中国的当政者，虽然除了还挂着共产党的名称之外早已名不符实，但是就这样一个极其重要的意义上来看她仍然是列宁主义者，那就是：毫不妥协地维护其垄断的政治权力。尽管如此，其政治改革的方向仍然是令人鼓舞的。
蒂莫西写道，身处地球的的其他地方的我们，如果能理解到中国事态所蕴含的意义，就应该从中国的改革者自己所设定的目标出发，尽我们所能地鼓励它。而不是说：“不，这样做不行，你们所需要的，应当是西方式多党民主制。”我们还应该说，“没错，就是要加强法治，我们可以提供许多具体的亲身经验来帮助你们；为了建设更专业化的政府公务员队伍，我们有一些有用的方法。通过提供一系列良好的政府管理和包括人权和公民权在内的法治工具，而不是一个简单的民主模式，会达到更好的效果。
30年前，我们可能会说，“列宁主义的资本主义”是自相矛盾的，就像说油炸冰淇淋。现在却不然，事实已经摆在我们眼前。在30多年的中国式的渐进改革后，就像邓小平说的那样，中国在“摸着石头过河”，谁能够知道，最终，他们将会到达一种什么样的政治彼岸？
但是，中国的制度充满了许多的紧张状况而坎坎坷坷。公众抗议活动时有发生，有时还会演变成暴力活动：例如最近示威者冲进了甘肃省的党委办公楼。这还是在经济衰退开始发生影响之前的事。任何政治制度的检验是它如何渡过艰难时刻的难关。而中国的制度，就像其产生的过去30年里，都还没有经历过这样的考验。
蒂莫西的文章指出，中国如果不进一步推进改革开放，前景如何？最有可能的情景就是我们已经看到的其他后－共产主义国家看到的状况。在那些地区民众高涨的期望值与低迷的经济发生冲突，民众的不满日益增长，这些后共产主义国家的统治者转向民族主义，以保住自己手中的权力。
我们有充足的理由相信，这种情况很可能会在中国发生。可以见到，在中国人中间，即使他们强烈地批评现行体制，也很少看到他们对西藏或新疆的穆斯林族群有多少同情。如果在那些少数民族中有某些绝望的成员，在中国某个大城市采取激进的暴力活动，大多数中国人反应的激烈程度，可能远甚于在印度发生的恐怖袭击事件时，印度人的反应。
活跃在网络博客中的中国民族主义者，反西方的态度远甚于对现政权的不满。如果在今后几年里，由于全球范围的经济衰退，美国和欧洲对中国出口品的抵制，地方政府官员的腐败，管理不善以及缺乏民主的管理，现行的制度不能满足民众越来越高的期望，当局为了维护政权的合法性，日渐趋向于鼓动民族主义，最终可能导致出现一种更加激进的民族主义。
蒂莫西写道，即使北京和华盛顿有最明智的领导人当政，但是在面对未来十年全球的权力平衡时，依然很难避免双方发生冲突。奥巴马12月1日在介绍他的国家安全班子时表示，“新兴的和过于自信的势力给国际社会带来紧张。”美国前太平洋司令部司令、海军上将威廉•法伦（William Fallon）最近透露，说，在布什当政下的五角大楼里的一些人“警告我说，你最好未雨绸缪，将来我们迟早要和中国打一仗。”
曾经在克林顿政府中担任负责中国政策的主要高级官员的谢淑丽（SusanShirk），是美国著名中国问题专家，她曾在1971年受到时任中国总理周恩来的接见。她写作了《脆弱的超级大国（China: Fragile Superpower）》一书。书中提到，美国人认为中国看上去并不脆弱，但是中国人又觉得自己根本不是超级大国。
谢淑丽提出，美国的政策应优先考虑中国的对外行为，以避免长期的发生战争的危险。但是，中国的对外行为又是与其内部动力密不可分的。
她说，在中国的这场前途未未卜的，渐进的经济和政治改革进程中，我们不能不关注他们的进展和后果，而且我们必须令其成功。否则，我们将全部身不由己，深受其害。
China's economic success may soon bring trouble. It would be ours too
The country's reformers seek incremental political changes to complement its gobsmacking growth. If they fail, it could be war
o Timothy Garton Ash in Shanghai
o The Guardian, Thursday December 4 2008
o Article history
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/dec/04/garton-ash-china-economy-comment
In Chinese reactions to the troubles of the rest of the world, from the terrorist attacks in Mumbai to the recession in the US and Europe, I hear a hint of complacency and a touch of arrogance. "If that's what you get with democracy, perhaps we're better off without it," is how one official thinker summarises his reaction to the atrocities in India. And if the west wants China to bail it out of this self-inflicted financial mess, it must give Beijing more power in international institutions. The refrain of "China's back" mingles with "that wouldn't happen here". They may be speaking too soon. If they are, it will be our problem as well as theirs.
Gobsmacking is the word to describe China's economic development over the 30 years since Deng Xiaoping initiated what has come to be known as the period of reform. In these three decades, growth has averaged more than 9% a year. As I write, I look out at the garishly neon-lit skyscrapers of downtown Shanghai, which make the business districts of all but the largest American cities seem low-rise and sober by comparison.
Across the river, the Superbrand Mall is a buzzing hive of conspicuous consumption, with young Chinese stopping off for a coffee at Starbucks, weighed down with shopping bags from the most fashionable western brands. Yes, cities like Shanghai are islands of urban prosperity in a sea of rural backwardness, but this growth has also lifted perhaps 300 million people out of extreme poverty. If it goes on like this, the Chinese economy will, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, be roughly the same size as those of the United States and the European Union by 2020. If.
The well-known free marketeer Zhang Weiying, dean of an impressive new management school at Peking University, argues that after 30 years the economic reform is essentially complete. Yes, the commanding heights of the economy are still occupied by giant state-controlled enterprises, but as they come to be quoted on stock exchanges across the world, gain minority private shareholders and face market pressures, so they increasingly behave like value-maximising companies. They have a long way to go, but the direction of travel is clear.
What's needed for the next 30 years, he suggests, is a complementary political reform, starting with the rule of law. This is an argument I have heard many times over the past fortnight, and in quite surprising places. For instance, in the austere offices of the Chinese Communist party's Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, an institution whose primary task is to collect and translate official writings and declarations, from Marx through Mao to Hu Jintao. Its deputy director, Yu Keping, a prominent political scientist and party reformer, argues that China is moving from the rule of man towards the rule of law. For the first time in several thousand years of Chinese statehood, he suggests, ordinary people are being offered legal recourse against political authority. Even the top party and state leaders should be subject to the law. The country also needs more transparent, less corrupt government; a civil service answering more efficiently to the needs of its citizens ("one-stop service!" he cries enthusiastically); and more democracy, both in local government and inside the Communist party. Comrade Lenin would be turning in his grave.
Practice lags far behind this theory. Any Chinese lawyer can tell you how far away the country is from having an independent judiciary. And its ruling authorities, though no longer communist in anything but name, are in one vital sense still Leninist: that is, uncompromisingly defending their monopoly of political power. Nonetheless, in political reforms too, the direction of travel is encouraging.
If we in the rest of the world have any sense, we will encourage it with every means at our disposal - starting from the aims set by Chinese reformers themselves. Rather than saying, "No, this can't work, what you need is western-style multi-party democracy", we should say, "Right, for strengthening the rule of law, here's this detailed body of experience; for a more professional civil service, we have this useful method". We will achieve more by offering a complex toolkit for good governance and the rule of law, including human and civil rights, rather than a single template for democracy.
Thirty years ago we would have said that Leninist capitalism was a contradiction in terms, like fried snowballs. Well, here it is, right in front of our eyes. After another 30 years of Chinese-style incremental reform, "crossing the river by feeling the stones" as Deng Xiaoping put it, who knows what new political riverbank they will have reached?
But the Chinese system is wrestling with many tensions. Public protests are a regular occurrence, and some turn violent: demonstrators recently stormed Communist party offices in Gansu province. And this is before the economic downturn has begun to bite. The test of any political system is how it withstands hard times. The Chinese system, as it has emerged over the past 30 years, has not yet stood that test.
What's the alternative to further open-ended, incremental reform? The most likely scenario is one that we have seen elsewhere in the post-communist world. Faced with growing discontent, as rising expectations clash with lowered economic performance, post-communist rulers turn to nationalism to preserve their own power. There's every reason to believe this could be popular in China. Even among Chinese people critical of the current system, one seldom finds much sympathy for the Tibetans or for the Muslim population in the northern province of Xinjiang. If a few despairing members of those small minorities turned to violence in one of China's big cities, the majority reaction would probably be degrees fiercer than in India.
Nationalist netizens in China's hyperactive blogosphere are more luridly anti-western than China's current rulers. If, in the coming years, the existing system were to fail to meet rising expectations - due to a combination of global recession, American and European resistance to Chinese exports, local corruption, mismanagement and lack of democratic controls - the temptation would grow to salvage legitimacy by turning to a more aggressive nationalism.
Even with the wisest leadership in Beijing and Washington, the global rebalancing of power over the next decades will be hard to manage without conflict. Introducing his national security team on Monday, Barack Obama observed that "newly assertive powers have put strains on the international system". A former US commander in the Pacific, Admiral William Fallon, recently revealed that there were people in the Pentagon under George W Bush "who warned me that you'd better get ready for the shoot 'em up here, because sooner or later we're going to be at war with China".
Susan Shirk, who was one of the senior US officials responsible for China policy in the Clinton administration, argues in her book, China: Fragile Superpower, that American policy should give priority to China's external behaviour, precisely to avert the long-term danger of war. But China's external behaviour can't be separated from its internal dynamics. We cannot afford not to be interested in the progress of its uncharted, incremental economic and political reforms, and we must want them to succeed. Otherwise we'll all be Shanghaied. [这是什么意思？]
timothygartonash.com
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