National Journal
http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/nj_20080802_7650.php#
After the Olympic flame flickers out, China will wake up to major challenges in its economy, in energy supplies, in the environment, and in diplomacy.
by Bruce Stokes
Sat. Aug 2, 2008
BEIJING--The students who packed a seminar room at China Foreign Affairs University, the training ground for the country's next generation of diplomats, were exceedingly bright, disarmingly articulate in English, and refreshingly outspoken. Eschewing small talk, they pressed visiting foreign journalists about Western news coverage of events in Tibet, and they complained that news photographs were being doctored because of anti-Chinese bias abroad.
Challenged about her nationalistic sentiments, one young woman shot back: "It's not nationalism, it's patriotism."
Chinese pride in the country's accomplishments and its future prospects is likely to be on full display in mid-August as Beijing hosts the 2008 Summer Olympics. But such patriotic sentiment is not simply a byproduct of Olympic euphoria. In the run-up to the Games, the Chinese government has stoked nationalism to shift public attention from Beijing's mishandling of the Sichuan earthquake, distract people from the slowing economy, and help rally China's burgeoning middle class to the ruling Communist Party.
"For much of the last half-century," observed Jeffrey Bader, director of the China Center at the Brookings Institution in Washington, "Chinese nationalism has been a defensive, wounded phenomenon. Somewhere in the last decade, nationalism has transformed itself into a much more self-confident, aggressive nationalism. One hears less about the century of humiliation and more that 'We are ready to take our place in the world.' It's a different kind of nationalism."
How a rising China deals with its changing role in the world--including defining what it means for China to be a responsible stakeholder in the global system and understanding the disconnect between the Chinese people's view of themselves and the world's view of China--is but one of the four major challenges that Beijing faces once the Olympic flame flickers out. The economy is next; it has slowed sharply in recent months, and China's meteoric growth over the past decade has left troubling economic distortions. The political system is No. 3 on the list; it is profoundly corrupt, is increasingly dysfunctional, and faces mounting public unrest. And finally, society faces energy and environmental constraints of unprecedented proportions.
These are not just Beijing's problems. They will also be Washington's. After years on the Bush administration's backburner, China and the challenges it faces will be one of the principal foreign-policy tests of the next U.S. president.
A Slowing Economy
After five years of economic growth that exceeded 10 percent annually and led to a near-doubling of per capita income, the Chinese people could not be happier with their economy. Eight in 10 Chinese expressed satisfaction with their country's direction, according to the 2008 Pew Global Attitudes survey. Among the 24 nations that Pew surveyed, the Chinese were the most satisfied with the way things were going in their country.
Nevertheless, signs of public unease are emerging, and Beijing may have some good reasons to fret about the nation's economic future. Inflation is a "very big" problem for a whopping 72 percent of the Chinese population, according to Pew. And 41 percent of Chinese think that economic inequality is a "very big" problem. Moreover, public expectations seem out of touch with economic prospects: 32 percent of those surveyed thought that economic conditions in China would "improve a lot" over the next year.
Such hopes could be dashed as the economy's widespread problems likely worsen in the months ahead. Economic growth has slowed from a high of 11.9 percent in the second quarter of 2007 to 10.1 percent in the second quarter of 2008. Standard Chartered Bank in Shanghai projects 9.9 percent growth this year and only 8.6 percent growth next year.
Most governments would ransom their national heritage for such economic performance. But for China's Communist Party leadership, whose legitimacy has become inextricably linked with the economy's good fortune, any slowdown is unnerving.
"If you are sitting in Beijing," said Nicholas Lardy, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, "you have to be worried that the global slowdown has not been that bad yet and we still have lost 2 percentage points of growth. They have to be asking themselves, 'How vulnerable are we going to be if the slowdown is deeper and longer?' "
According to Douglas Paal, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, Beijing is worried about a financial bust after the Olympics, once infrastructure spending for the Games ends and property speculation driven by Olympic enthusiasm cools. The stock market has already fallen precipitously, and further declines could undermine consumer confidence and spending.
In the long term, despite its recent phenomenal strength, the Chinese economy faces profound structural problems. The country's current-account surplus, which includes merchandise trade receipts and capital inflows, equaled 11.1 percent of gross domestic product last year, up dramatically from 1.7 percent in 2000. Americans, frustrated by a seemingly intractable trade deficit, might find such success enviable, but for the Chinese this unprecedented economic imbalance is a headache.
All of this foreign money flooding into the Chinese market stokes the country's inflation rate, now running at 7.9 percent. To soak up the cash, the government sells bonds. As a result, foreign-exchange reserves, much of it in U.S. dollars, have now more than doubled in the past four years. And with the dollar's weakening, Beijing is losing money. To ease the current-account surplus and cool inflation, China has let its currency, the renminbi, appreciate about 15 percent across the board. But even greater appreciation is needed to correct the imbalance.
That, however, would threaten to price some Chinese exports out of world markets. Already, export growth has slowed. This contraction translates into less job creation and risks political discontent in a society that has become accustomed to creating 30,000 jobs per day.
Despite China's economic success and press reports of rising wages, satisfaction with household income has improved only modestly in recent years, according to the Pew survey. This frustration reflects the fact that, as a proportion of the entire economy, household incomes in China are actually declining. Consumption as a portion of GDP is well below the average for the past three decades and is significantly less than the recent experience of other Asian countries.
If economic growth is to remain robust, economists contend that more Chinese must benefit from the country's success, that market-oriented reforms are needed to encourage a wider availability of consumer services, and that the government must boost spending on health care and pensions to reassure the people that they don't have to save so much. (The current household savings rate exceeds 20 percent.)
Public dissatisfaction with household income is political dynamite. "Peace in the cities is maintained by the belief that upward mobility is happening," said Kenneth Lieberthal, a professor at the University of Michigan. "If this is lost, there could be a social explosion."
Pollution Problems
Growing environmental and energy problems are clouding China's prospects for continued economic growth. "They have missed an opportunity to jump-start their environmental effort via the Olympics," said Liz Economy, director of Asian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City. "When they exhale after the Games, they will be facing the same range of problems."
The immediate challenges are air and water pollution and local water shortages. Sixteen of the world's 20 most polluted cities are in China, with particulate and sulfur dioxide levels among the highest anywhere. Finding clean water is an even greater challenge. Of China's 640 largest urban areas, at least 100 face severe water scarcity. The water table under the north China plain is falling rapidly, and a number of rivers are being pumped dry. China spends $100 billion a year to treat dirty water and find clean water, a capital expenditure second only to real estate investment. This is costly to both the economy and human health.
The good news for Beijing is that eight in 10 Chinese now agree that the government should make environmental protection a priority, even if it leads to slower economic growth and some job losses, according to the Pew survey.
The bad news is the inherent difficulty in getting the Chinese political system to curb pollution. At the township and village levels, the performance evaluation criteria for local leaders, their likelihood for promotion, and their opportunities for kickbacks have long depended on promoting economic growth. These officials receive few rewards for curbing pollution. So a wastewater treatment plant may get built, because that shows up as local investment and job creation. But it may never be used, because day-to-day operations cost money.
Moreover, while environmentalists in China tout their newfound ability to sue polluters or government officials who have not enforced environmental regulations, activists acknowledge that they seldom win such cases and, if they do, the judgments never seem to get enforced.
Resource Constraints
China's economic boom has also created an almost insatiable thirst for energy. In the 1980s and '90s, the nation's energy use grew at less than half the rate of economic growth, but in this decade consumption has grown faster than the economy, outstripping domestic energy supplies. Once a net exporter of coal, China is now a net importer. Its oil imports grew 12.7 percent in the first five months of this year, and China now imports more than 47 percent of the petroleum it consumes.
This growing dependence on foreign oil has led Beijing farther and farther afield in search of secure supplies. By the British government's count, China has 32 agreements with oil-producing countries. Beijing is slowly realizing that the interests of the Chinese state oil companies may clash with national foreign-policy concerns. This scramble for resources threatens to enmesh the Chinese in even more political quagmires than the ones in which they already find themselves, most notably in Sudan but also in Angola, Nigeria, and Venezuela. In 2007, nine Chinese oil workers were killed in southern Ethiopia. Such dangers will only grow in the years ahead, and the Chinese public's demands that Beijing defend the country's workers and interests overseas will not be far behind.
"They are obsessed with having equity stakes in resources so that the international market cannot cut them off," said Harry Harding, a professor of international affairs at George Washington University. "And they are blind to the risk they run in the eyes of the world by seeming to support odious regimes."
Curbing energy use will require swallowing some bitter economic medicine. China shields consumers from the full brunt of oil costs by controlling retail energy prices. That subsidy could equal about 1.2 percent of China's GDP this year, or more than $70 billion. Allowing prices to rise would encourage more-efficient energy use, and some observers think that Beijing may be ready to make that move, assuming that the Olympics go well. Taking that money out of consumers' pockets, however, could depress their spending in the short run, further slowing the economy.
Beijing is also facing growing pressure to curb its emissions of carbon dioxide, the principal global-warming gas. China generates more CO2 than any other country and accounted for more than three-fifths of the growth in such emissions worldwide between 2001 and 2007. Both the European Union and the United States have threatened to penalize imports of carbon-intensive Chinese products if Beijing does not reduce such emissions. But with 70 percent of its carbon dioxide emissions released by industry, compared with less than 25 percent in the United States, reducing CO2 could curtail Chinese economic growth.
"This is an issue that is fraught with peril," said Trevor Houser, a partner in the Rhodium Group, an international consulting firm. And corrective action has little support from the Chinese public, only 24 percent of whom think that global warming is a very serious problem, the lowest level of such concern in the world, according to the Pew survey.
Political Legitimacy
"We are in the sixth inning of Hu Jintao's administration, and he has yet to hit a home run," said Minxin Pei, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. "People will soon be asking, 'What is his legacy?' And the Olympics will not do it."
Government spending has increased under Hu, but public expectations have grown even faster. "Their entire political structure rests on the fact that next year will be better for my family than this year, and that requires 8 to 10 percent growth rates to achieve," said Charles Freeman, who holds the Freeman chair in China studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "If you can't deliver on those growth rates, that undermines the legitimacy of the government."
In the Pew survey, only 28 percent of those Chinese questioned opposed recent government-led economic reforms. People in that minority are disgruntled, however, and they have lukewarm views about the job that Beijing is doing on the issues that matter most to them. They are more likely than others to voice worries about unemployment, conditions for workers, education, and health care. Overall, 39 percent of all Chinese consider current levels of corruption a "very big" problem.
Increasingly, this disgruntlement has spilled over into the streets. The central government acknowledges that the number of "mass incidents"--everything from neighborhood rallies to pitched battles with police--skyrocketed from 8,700 in 1993 to 74,000 in 2004.
These disturbances have largely occurred in small towns and rural areas, enabling Beijing to contain the unrest, so far. But recent demonstrations in Chengdu against the building of a chemical plant and in Shanghai opposing a high-speed train suggest that "an educated, rising middle-class elite are pushing for a larger voice in the political process," said Liz Economy of the Council on Foreign Relations.
With the chaos that led to millions of deaths during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution still fresh in their minds, China's new middle class deeply fears instability and the loss of what it has so recently secured. So, "it will take the Chinese middle class longer to get politically involved," predicted David Lampton, director of the China studies program at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington. "But it's a question of timing rather than it not happening."
Steps toward democratization in China's rural areas were supposed to release the buildup in this political pressure cooker. Instead, the village and township elections instituted in some parts of China in 1988 have been halted because of corruption. In their place, the government is experimenting with what it calls consultative or deliberative democracy: public hearings to identify issues of local concern and the choice of lower-level party leaders through public opinion polls.
"The Communist Party has been pretty adroit at reinventing itself since 1990," said the Brookings Institution's Bader, "and it will continue to do so in a way that is more transparent and accountable." The Chinese public's profound aversion to instability affords the government time to build a democracy with Chinese characteristics. But that time horizon may be finite.
The Stakeholder Disconnect
The next U.S. president is likely to discover that his greatest difficulties with China stem from Beijing's struggle to find its place in the world.
A profound disconnect exists between how the Chinese see themselves and their role in the world, and how the world views them. Three in four Chinese think that people in other countries have a favorable opinion of China. In fact, according to the Pew survey, majorities in only seven of 23 countries have a positive opinion of China. And, in the 21 nations where trends from last year are available, China's favorability rating has actually declined in nine and increased in only two. It stayed the same in the 10 others.
Overwhelming majorities in 15 of the 23 countries that Pew surveyed also see China's growing military power as a bad thing. Although a majority of Chinese say that their economy's impact on other countries is positive, majorities or pluralities in 10 of the nations polled by Pew, including some of China's major trading partners, think that China's might is harmful to other economies.
In a sign that Chinese behavior abroad is also engendering the kind of resentment once only generated by American foreign policy, majorities in 14 of the 23 nations believe that China acts unilaterally on the world stage. The Chinese, however, see it otherwise: Eight in 10 say that their country takes into account the interests of other nations when making foreign-policy decisions.
In 2005, then-Deputy U.S. Secretary of State Robert Zoellick called on the Chinese to become what he termed "responsible stakeholders" in the international system. This term has stuck; the problem is in getting the Chinese and the rest of the world to agree on exactly how China's interests can be accommodated without it running rampant over the interests of other major global stakeholders.
"The original formulation of the 'responsible stakeholder' concept was silent on the question of which Chinese interests were legitimate and deserving of respect," notes Phillip Saunders, a senior research fellow at the National Defense University in Washington. "The United States will not be able to ignore this question forever."
The University of Michigan's Lieberthal agreed. "[Barack] Obama or [John] McCain will confront a China that sees the value of the current system and wants to play a significant role as a developer of the rules," he said. "That is very much in the U.S. interest. But China's values are not our values."
Whether Beijing's perception of responsible behavior corresponds to or clashes with Washington's could be made painfully clear very soon over Taiwan. Beijing and the new Taipei government have recently made great strides in improving ties. But the Bush administration is about to make a long-delayed decision on arms sales to Taiwan. The timing of that move, which military technologies are included in that package, and how the mainland responds will set the context for the ever-volatile Taiwan issue in the next U.S. administration.
"This is a short-term decision that has lots of knock-on results that will either facilitate or make more difficult China getting more international cooperation on a range of issues," Lampton said.
Chinese nationalism is also a wild card in the country's future relations with the rest of the world. "The Chinese have a precarious sense of self-confidence that can be easily offended and provoked into anger," warned Carnegie's Paal. As a result, his Carnegie colleague Pei said, "the Chinese government has to appeal to an assertive, vocal domestic audience by projecting a foreign policy that defends national pride at the same time it is trying to show the world that it is a responsible stakeholder. This is increasingly difficult."
The Olympics have preoccupied the Chinese and their leadership for the past few years, and over the next few weeks the Games will crowd out all other news on China. How the Olympics play out--whether they are the rousing triumph and entry of the new China onto the world stage that Beijing hopes, or whether they are marred by shortcomings and embarrassing demonstrations--will obviously set the tone both domestically and internationally for China for some time to come. Once the athletes march out of the Olympic stadium, the fundamental challenges that China faces--economically, environmentally, politically, and diplomatically--will be the same difficulties that China faced when the Olympic teams trooped in. How Beijing copes with these problems will determine how big an agenda item China becomes on the next U.S. president's calendar.
奥运之后中国面临的挑战
选择周刊布鲁斯•斯多克斯
北京：中国外交学院的一个会议室里，聚集着一群学生——这个国家下一代的外交官，他们相当聪明，英语流利，态度坦诚。省却了客套，他们直接和来访的外国记者谈起西方媒体对西藏事件的报导，责怪媒体出于反华偏见而对新闻图片做手脚。一个女生被质疑有民族主义情绪，她反驳说：“这不是民族主义，是爱国主义。”
中国人对国家成就的自豪、对未来的满怀期待，将会淋漓尽致地体现在8月中旬——期间北京将举办2008夏季奥林匹克运动会。不过，这样的爱国主义情感可不是简单的奥运狂欢的副产品。在奥运的准备阶段中，中国政府成功地激发了民族主义情绪，转移了公众对四川地震处理失当的注意力，减少了人们对经济发展变慢的关注，又把正在成长的中产阶层拉拢到执政党一边。华盛顿布鲁金斯学会中国中心主任杰弗里•贝德说：“过去半个世纪的大部分时间里，中国民族主义一直是处于被动、悲情的状态，然而在近十年里，这种民族主义发展成一种十分自信、好斗的民族主义。人们不再频繁提起百年耻辱，而是更多地说：‘我们已经准备好，我们要屹立于世界民族强林。’这是一种不同的民族主义。”
一个崛起中的中国将如何演绎自己的新角色？这包括了：中国将如何定义国际事务上的“负责任的利益攸关者”，如何理解中国人的自视与外国人的观感之间的脱节。当奥运火焰熄灭后，中国还要面对另外的三个挑战。经济问题首当其冲，最近几个月，经济发展趋缓，过去十年的飞速增长留下了令人头疼的经济结构失调。接下来就是政治体制，目前腐败深重，政府失能，民怨积累。最后，能源和环境问题也带来前所未有的制约。这些不仅是北京的问题，也是华盛顿面临的问题。多年来中国问题一直不是布什政府的关注重点，但却即将成为下任总统重大外交政策的考验之一。
经济发展趋缓
过去5年里，经济以年均超10%的速度增长，人均收入增加了近一倍，中国人民对本国的经济状况心满意足。根据2008皮尤全球态度调查，每10个中国人中有8个对国家发展势头感到满意。在皮尤调查的24个国家中，中国人对本国的发展最为满意。
然而，公众焦虑的信号正在出现，北京有理由为国家经济前景感到不安。皮尤调查显示，72%之众的中国人觉得通货膨胀是“严重”问题。41%的中国人认为经济失衡是“严重”问题。并且，公众期待与经济发展前景似乎出现脱节：32%的被调查人口认为中国经济状况在明年会有“很大改善”。而未来几个月普遍存在的经济问题一旦出现恶化，这样的希望就会随之破灭。2007年第二季度的增长率有11.9%之高，2008年第二季度却下降为10.1%。上海的渣打银行预计今年增长率为9.9%，而明年仅为8.6%。大多数政府都愿意用这样的经济成绩作为自己的政治遗产，然而中国政权的稳定性已经和经济的美好前景密不可分，任何一种经济变缓都会令当政者不安。
华盛顿彼得森国际经济学院高级研究员尼古拉斯•拉迪说：“如果你在北京当权，你也会担忧：国际经济放缓还没那么严重呢，我们却已经损失了两个百分点的增长率。你不得不自问，‘如果国际经济衰退加剧，持续时间加长，我们还将会脆弱成什么样子？’”据卡内基国际和平基金会副主席道格拉斯•帕尔所言，北京正担心，奥运结束后，为奥运会而进行基础设施投资停止了，奥运热情激发的资产投机冷却了，中国就有可能会发生金融崩溃。股票市场已经大幅下跌，进一步的衰退会挫伤消费者的信心，从而减少消费。
从长远来看，虽然中国经济近年取得非凡的成绩，它仍面临严重的结构性问题。国家经常账户盈余(包括商贸收入和资本流入)相当于去年GDP的11.1%，而在2000年这个数字只有1.7%。对疲于应付贸易赤字的美国人来说，这个数字令他们羡慕不已，然而对中国人来说，这种空前的经济失衡令他们头痛。这些流入中国市场的外资加剧了通货膨胀，目前通货膨胀率已经达到7.9%。为了吸收现金，政府发行债券。导致的结果是：以美元为主的外汇储备在过去四年翻了一番还多。随着美元疲软，中国的钱随之不断损失。为了缓解经常账户盈余、降低通货膨胀，中国已经让人民币升值了15%。然而，为了纠正经济失衡，还需要进一步升值。
但升值又会威胁中国出口产品的价格优势。出口增长已经放慢，这样的收缩会使新工作机会减少。而这个国家已经习惯于每天产生3万个新工作机会，就业机会减少可能会引发社会不满。根据皮尤的调查，尽管经济取得成就，媒体报导工资上涨，家庭收入的满意度却提高得很有限。这种失落反映了一个事实：作为整体经济一部分的家庭收入实际上在下降。过去三十年以来，作为GDP一部分的消费增长一直低于平均增长水平，近些年更是远低于其他亚洲国家。
经济学家主张，如果要保持经济持续强健增长，必需要有更多的中国人从经济发展中受益，需要进一步的市场化改革来鼓励服务性行业，政府必须增加对健康、养老的投入，让人们放心地消费，而不是一个劲地存钱(目前家庭储蓄已经超过了收入的20%)。公众对家庭收入的不满是潜在的炸药包。密歇根大学教授李侃如 (Kenneth Lieberthal)说：“城市里能保持和平，是因为大家相信明天会更好。如果这种信念没了，剧烈冲突就可能爆发。”
污染与能源的制约
日益严重的环境和能源问题给中国的经济发展前景蒙上了乌云。美国对外关系委员会亚洲研究部主任莉兹•伊科诺米说：“他们已经错过了通过奥运会来启动环境改善运动的机会。奥运会过后，老问题还会出现。”迫在眉睫的问题是空气和水污染以及地方水供应紧张。世界上污染最严重的20个城市里有16个在中国，其中颗粒物质和二氧化硫含量为世界之最。找到干净的水源更为困难。在中国640个大城市中，至少有100个面临严重的水资源短缺。华北平原的地下水位正快速下降，不少河流被抽干了。中国每年花上千个亿来处理污水和寻找洁净水源，在这上面的投资仅次于房地产。这对经济、对人口健康来说都是代价昂贵。
根据皮尤的调查，每10个中国人中有8个同意，即使影响经济增长、导致一些工作流失，政府也要优先考虑环境保护。这样的民众环保意识对政府来说是个好消息。坏消息是中国处理污染有体制上的困难。乡镇级、村级地方干部的业绩考核、提拔和收取回扣的机会都取决于促进经济增长。这些官员们从治理环境捞不到多少好处。所以，他们可能会建一个污水处理厂，这样能显示出地方积极投入和增加工作机会。但却可能因为嫌日常运作费钱，而从来不使用这个厂。
并且，虽然中国环境保护人士已经能状告污染责任人或政府官员未能执行环境条例——但这些环保积极分子承认，他们很少能赢得官司，哪怕赢了，判决也从来得不到执行。中国的经济繁荣同时促发了对能源的无尽渴求。在80年代和90年代，中国能源消耗的增长低于经济增长速率的一半，但是在最近10年，能源消耗的增长超过了经济增长速度，也超出了本国供应能力。中国本是煤炭净出口国，现在成了净进口国。在今年头5个月，石油进口就涨了12.7%，超过47%的石油消耗依赖进口。
对进口石油日益增长的依赖使得北京在全球各地寻找可靠的供应者。根据英国政府统计，中国已经和石油输出国签订了32个协议。北京已经逐渐意识到国有石油公司的利益可能会和国家外交政策产生冲突。中国遇到的外交泥潭本来就不少，对能源的寻求可能会使中国陷入更多的国际政治漩涡中，最突出的是苏丹，但同样还有安哥拉、尼日利亚和委内瑞拉。2007年，9个中国石油工人在埃塞俄比亚南部被害。这样的危险在未来几年还会增加，而中国公众也会随之要求政府保护工人和海外利益。
乔治•华盛顿大学国际事务教授哈里•哈丁说：“他们执迷于在资源问题上争取自己的份额，这样国际市场没办法孤立他们。不过他们忽视了另一种危险——国际形象上的危险，他们几乎是在支持一些臭名昭著的政权。”要降低能源消耗就意味着要吞下一些经济上的苦药。一直以来，中国通过控制能源零售价格，从而避免消费者直接受到原油价格上升的冲击。这些补贴相当于今年GDP的1.2个百分点，超过700个亿。允许价格上升能促进能源的节约使用。一些观察者认为如果奥运会进展顺利，中国将会采取这一步。然而，从消费者口袋里拿走这些补贴在短期内会进一步降低消费欲望，加重经济变缓。
北京还日益面临着要求减少二氧化碳排放的压力，二氧化碳是全球变暖的首要元凶。中国的二氧化碳排放量超出任何其他国家，从2001到2007年，全球二氧化碳排放增长中的3/5来自中国。美国和欧盟威胁，如果中国不减少排放，他们要对中国出口的碳密集产品进行处罚。然而，中国70%的二氧化碳来自工业排放 ——美国只有25%，降低二氧化碳排放意味着放缓中国的经济增长。
国际咨询公司Rhodium Group的专家特雷弗•豪泽说：“这个问题充满了陷阱。”而且，中国公众并不支持降低排放的行动，根据皮尤调查显示，只有24%的人认为全球变暖是很严重的问题，这个百分比是所有被调查国家中最低的。
社会稳定
卡内基国际和平基金会高级会员裴敏欣说，“当前领导班子上台已经六年了，人们仍在期待他们能打出漂亮的本垒打。人们很快就会问，他们能留下什么呢？”光是靠奥运会是不够的。胡上任以来，政府开支增加了，而公众期待增长得更快。主持国际战略研究中心费和中国研究讲座的查尔斯•弗里曼说，他们的长治久安基于这样的民众期待：明年会比今年好，这需要每年8个到10个百分点的增长率来支持。如果没有达到这样的增长率，就会影响政府的稳定。
皮尤调查显示，有28%的被调查人反对近年来政府领导的经济改革。这一小部分人心有不满，对北京在与他们切身相关问题上的所做所为漠不关心。这些人最有可能对失业、工作环境、教育、医疗方面表示顾虑。总的来说，39%的人认为如今腐败程度“十分严重”。
这种不满逐渐渗入大街小巷。中央政府承认，群体事件(包括从邻里集会到激烈的警民冲突)从1993年的8,700件上升到2004年的74,000件。这些骚乱通常发生在小乡镇和农村地区，所以目前来说还算比较容易平息下来。不过，最近发生的成都反对建化工厂和上海反对建高速铁路的两起事件，暗示着受教育的中产精英开始在社会事务上发出自己的声音。
大跃进和文革造成的混乱令人难以忘却，所以中国新中产阶层特别害怕不稳定，害怕失去目前所拥有的一切。约翰•霍普金斯大学高级国际研究中心中国研究部主任戴维•兰普顿说，还要过一段时间中国中产阶层才会开始介入政治，不过这只是时间问题。中国农村地区的民主化运动本来是要缓解这里的社会紧张的。然而，自1988年中国部分地区开始的村级和乡镇级选举由于腐败而不得不终止。取而代之的是政府试验的所谓协商式民主：通过听证会来了解地方群众关心的事情；通过民意调查来选择党员担任基层领导。
布鲁金斯学会的杰弗里•贝德说：“1990年以来，中共在改造自身上已经做得很灵活，而且还会继续向透明化和负责任方面改进。”中国公众对不稳定深为忌惮，这就给了政府时间来建立有中国特色的民主。但这个时间也不是无限期的。
利益攸关者的貌合神离
下一任美国总统可能会发现，他处理中国事务的最大困难来自北京要争取在国际事务中有一席之地。中国人怎么看待他们自己和他们在世界中的位置，而世界又怎么看他们，这两者之间有明显的脱节。四分之三的中国人认为其他国家对中国有好印象。实际上，根据皮尤调查，23个被调查国家中只有7个国家的大多数被调查人对中国有正面印象。并且，在有去年调查记录可查的21个国家中，中国的受欢迎程度在9个国家有所下降，而只在2个国家有所上升，在其他10个国家保持不变。
皮尤调查的23个国家当中，15个国家中的压倒性多数认为中国不断增长的军事力量不是好事。虽然多数中国人说他们的经济对其他国家的影响是正面的，皮尤调查的国家中有10个国家(其中包括中国主要贸易伙伴)的多数或是相对多数的被调查人认为，中国的实力不利于其他国家的经济。23个被调查国家中有14个认为中国在国际舞台采取单边行动，这表明了中国的对外举动已经引发了不满，而以前只有美国的外交政策能引起这种不满。然而，中国人却不这么看：每10个被调查人中有8个说中国在制定外交政策时考虑到了其他国家的利益。
2005年，时任美国副国务卿的罗伯特•佐利克呼吁中国在国际事务中担当起所谓“负责任的利益攸关者”。这个说法如今陷入僵局；怎样让中国和其他国家达成共识，如何让中国的利益得到照顾、同时又不损害其他主要利益攸关者，这是面临的主要问题。华盛顿国防大学高级研究员菲利普•桑德斯指出，“当初提出‘负责任的利益攸关者’这个说法，却没有回答这个问题：哪些中国利益是合乎原则、值得尊重的。美国永远不能忽视这个问题。”密歇根大学的中国问题专家李侃如 (Kenneth Lieberthal)也这么认为，他说：“不管是奥巴马还是麦凯恩谁会当选，都会面临这样一个问题。中国认识到了参与国际事务的价值，希望能在其中扮演规则制定者这样重要的角色。这与美国利益是大体一致的，但中国所认同的价值并不是美国的价值。”
在台湾问题上，很快就能令人清楚地看到，北京所认为负责任的行动是否符合美国的观点。北京和台北新政府最近在松绑两岸关系上不断取得进步。不过，关于对台武器销售，布什政府正要作出一个已经推迟了很久的决定。这一有关军事技术的举措所采取的时机，以及大陆将会如何反应，都为下届政府如何处理瞬息万变的台湾问题设下了背景。这是一个短期决策，却有许多直接后果，要么会促进、要么会阻碍中国在一系列问题上参与更多的国际合作。
中国的民族主义也是中国未来对外关系中的不确定因素。卡内基国际和平基金会副主席道格拉斯•帕尔警告，“中国人有种敏感的自负，很容易感到被冒犯、被激怒。”他的同事裴敏欣说，“(于是)面对着自负、吵吵嚷嚷的本国民众，中国政府不得不制定一个能维护国家尊严的外交政策，与此同时，又要向世界展示它是一个负责任的利益攸关者。这可是越来越困难。”
在过去几年里，中国及其领导人全神贯注于奥运会；在接下来的几个星期，有关奥运会的报道将会铺天盖地。奥运会举办得如何，能否如北京所愿成为欢欣鼓舞的胜利、并成为中国登上世界舞台的大门，或是反过来被一些缺陷和令人尴尬的示威搞得灰头土脸——这显然将在一段时间内决定中国的国内和国际形象。等运动员们离开了奥林匹克体育馆，中国所面临的根本问题，经济上的，环境上的，政治上的，外交上的，还会如同奥林匹克大军进驻前一样令人头疼。北京怎样处理这些问题，将决定在下届美国总统的议程上，中国会是一个大麻烦，还是小问题。
