特稿：镇压太成功，不会想民主
（标题为傻逼多维编辑所拟，不着边际）
多维社记者陈湘编译报导/在中国信奉穆斯林的少数民族维吾尔族的聚集地－－新疆地区发生的暴动，将使许多中国国外的分析师更加肯定，社会动荡将直接威胁到中国共产党的统治。如果，中共官员不花时间、不下功夫来研究如何避免这类暴动，这种观点迟早会变成现实，很可能最终导致中国现政府的垮台。
如果中国官员们都这么想就好了。
可惜，即便是在报导说乌鲁木齐市至少有156人死亡后，中国的许多官员还将新近发生的这场暴乱－维吾尔人打砸抢烧汉族人的店铺－简单地说成是维族人“忘恩负义”。
纽约时报发表来自美国的中国人民大学教授、北京中国研究中心主任墨儒思（Russell Leigh Moses）一篇题为“北京总是赢家”（Beijing Always Wins）的评论文章。该文章说，中共的官方报刊《人民日报》的一篇头版评论员文章称，此次示威是“严重暴力犯罪事件”，而不是公民们不满受歧视的政策，以这种方式来表达愤怒。眼下这种观点在首都北京非常普遍。很少有人因为对政府所采取的武力行为感到意外，不少人还击掌称赞。在北京的一名商人就对汉族同胞表示关怀，并责问维吾尔人，“他们对我们给他们提了供那么多金钱，他们感谢过吗？”
爱国主义热潮，加上人们担忧动乱可能会损害他们从经济改革中艰难赢得的利益，这些会为政府采取的强硬政策赢得了更多支持。而维吾尔人的真正苦恼则鲜有人关注：北京对信奉伊斯兰教的严格控制；汉族人移居到新疆，抢走当地的好工作；以及少数民族在政府部门中没有地位的事实，在中国，做工商业大部分也都要通过政府。
在新疆，宗教信仰、当地民俗和教育选择，这些都由国家牢牢控制住。清真寺可以得到修理和翻新，但是，孩子们却被不允许入内参加礼拜。在暴乱发生后一天，人们再次聚集在乌鲁木齐的清真寺外示威抗议，证明了越来越多的中国穆斯林的心声。这些示威活动也很快被地方公安驱散。
纽约时报的这篇文章认为，成功孕育重复：政府的成功模式在一次次事件中重复，而政府在与示威者的博弈中似乎总是赢家－通过镇压，通过说服民众返家，通过关押示威活动领导人，等等，最后赢的总是政府。上个月，在湖北石首，关于一名年轻人的离奇死亡的谣言引爆了数千人的游街抗议，但是，警察一出动后，人群很快就因恐惧而作鸟兽散。近期在贵阳因为土地纠纷和就业问题引发的几起暴乱，很快也都在当地党政官员、警察和武警的协力下扑灭。鲜有迹象表明，政府愿意通过对话而不是压制来解决问题。事实上，一些来自乌鲁木齐的报道也显示，示威活动一开始是和平的，大部分打砸抢烧是在大批武警出现后发生的。
党干部都清楚，北京的领导层大都由不惧使用武力来镇压示威的官僚们组成。例如，1989年镇压天安门事件和西藏暴乱时，中国决策人就称其为经济改革创造了条件。党员们似乎十分清楚，谁支持镇压，谁就能飞黄腾达。
纽约时报的这篇文章还认为，许多中国官员在处理威胁到他们统治权的情况时，手法老道，而且，他们懂得如何利用先进科技。在新疆暴乱发生不久后，当地的手机和网络服务就被切断。当暴乱发生的消息传出后，大部分新闻都被官员们高明地控制着。我在北京的朋友就在他们手机上收到短信，讲述政府标准版的暴乱经过。政府的代表还四处散发国家新闻部门拍摄的照片。
官方的新闻媒体提到了汉族人的店铺被抢、被烧，不过，却对维吾尔人的摊位受到攻击只字不提，而且，还反复提倡安定和谐的口号。
文章最后指出，中国的这些政府机构在处理暴乱事件时屡战屡胜。这就决定了大规模暴乱肯定会被血腥镇压的命运。它还显示，社会动乱并不会引导中国走向民主。党太强大、太有信心，不会允许自下而上的变革。
OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
如果中国官员们都这么想就好了。
可惜，即便是在报导说乌鲁木齐市至少有156人死亡后，中国的许多官员还将新近发生的这场暴乱－维吾尔人打砸抢烧汉族人的店铺－简单地说成是维族人“忘恩负义”。
纽约时报发表来自美国的中国人民大学教授、北京中国研究中心主任墨儒思（Russell Leigh Moses）一篇题为“北京总是赢家”（Beijing Always Wins）的评论文章。该文章说，中共的官方报刊《人民日报》的一篇头版评论员文章称，此次示威是“严重暴力犯罪事件”，而不是公民们不满受歧视的政策，以这种方式来表达愤怒。眼下这种观点在首都北京非常普遍。很少有人因为对政府所采取的武力行为感到意外，不少人还击掌称赞。在北京的一名商人就对汉族同胞表示关怀，并责问维吾尔人，“他们对我们给他们提了供那么多金钱，他们感谢过吗？”
爱国主义热潮，加上人们担忧动乱可能会损害他们从经济改革中艰难赢得的利益，这些会为政府采取的强硬政策赢得了更多支持。而维吾尔人的真正苦恼则鲜有人关注：北京对信奉伊斯兰教的严格控制；汉族人移居到新疆，抢走当地的好工作；以及少数民族在政府部门中没有地位的事实，在中国，做工商业大部分也都要通过政府。
在新疆，宗教信仰、当地民俗和教育选择，这些都由国家牢牢控制住。清真寺可以得到修理和翻新，但是，孩子们却被不允许入内参加礼拜。在暴乱发生后一天，人们再次聚集在乌鲁木齐的清真寺外示威抗议，证明了越来越多的中国穆斯林的心声。这些示威活动也很快被地方公安驱散。
纽约时报的这篇文章认为，成功孕育重复：政府的成功模式在一次次事件中重复，而政府在与示威者的博弈中似乎总是赢家－通过镇压，通过说服民众返家，通过关押示威活动领导人，等等，最后赢的总是政府。上个月，在湖北石首，关于一名年轻人的离奇死亡的谣言引爆了数千人的游街抗议，但是，警察一出动后，人群很快就因恐惧而作鸟兽散。近期在贵阳因为土地纠纷和就业问题引发的几起暴乱，很快也都在当地党政官员、警察和武警的协力下扑灭。鲜有迹象表明，政府愿意通过对话而不是压制来解决问题。事实上，一些来自乌鲁木齐的报道也显示，示威活动一开始是和平的，大部分打砸抢烧是在大批武警出现后发生的。
党干部都清楚，北京的领导层大都由不惧使用武力来镇压示威的官僚们组成。例如，1989年镇压天安门事件和西藏暴乱时，中国决策人就称其为经济改革创造了条件。党员们似乎十分清楚，谁支持镇压，谁就能飞黄腾达。
纽约时报的这篇文章还认为，许多中国官员在处理威胁到他们统治权的情况时，手法老道，而且，他们懂得如何利用先进科技。在新疆暴乱发生不久后，当地的手机和网络服务就被切断。当暴乱发生的消息传出后，大部分新闻都被官员们高明地控制着。我在北京的朋友就在他们手机上收到短信，讲述政府标准版的暴乱经过。政府的代表还四处散发国家新闻部门拍摄的照片。
官方的新闻媒体提到了汉族人的店铺被抢、被烧，不过，却对维吾尔人的摊位受到攻击只字不提，而且，还反复提倡安定和谐的口号。
文章最后指出，中国的这些政府机构在处理暴乱事件时屡战屡胜。这就决定了大规模暴乱肯定会被血腥镇压的命运。它还显示，社会动乱并不会引导中国走向民主。党太强大、太有信心，不会允许自下而上的变革。
OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
Beijing Always Wins
By RUSSELL LEIGH MOSES
Published: July 7, 2009
Beijing
THE riots in the Xinjiang region, the home of China’s Muslim Uighur minority, will affirm to many analysts outside the country that social unrest is a direct threat to the continued rule of the Communist Party. If officials don’t take a long, hard look at how to avoid such uprisings, this argument will run, the government could eventually fall.
If only Chinese officials saw things that way.
But even after at least 156 people have been reported dead in the city of Urumqi, many officials here see the recent violence — with Uighur rioters torching businesses owned by Han Chinese, China’s ethnic majority — as simple ingratitude.
A front-page editorial in the state-run People’s Daily described the protests as criminal actions by rioters, not as the manifestation of complaints of citizens angered by discriminatory policies. That view is already popular here in the capital. Few are surprised by the violence meted out by the state, and more than a few applaud it. A merchant in east Beijing expressed allegiance with his fellow Han entrepreneurs and, referring to the large outlays of aid to Xinjiang, asked of the Uighurs, “Where is their thanks for all the money we provide them?”
Both nationalistic fervor and the fear that instability might reverse the hard-won individual gains of economic reform combine to create more support for the government’s hard-line approach. Less discussed are the Uighurs’ real grievances: Beijing’s tight control over the practice of Islam; Han Chinese who migrate to Xinjiang and take the better jobs there; and the fact that ethnic minorities lack regular access to the government bureaucracy, where business in China is largely done.
Religious practice, local customs and educational choices in Xinjiang are controlled by the state to a draconian degree. Mosques are being repaired and modernized, but children have not been allowed to attend services. The follow-up demonstrations in Urumqi the day after the riots erupted took place outside mosques, testifying to the rallying cry of religion for a growing number of Chinese Muslims. These protests, too, were quickly broken up by local security forces.
Success breeds repetition, and the state always seems to win every contest with protesters — by cracking down, by persuading people to return to their homes, by imprisoning suspected ringleaders. Last month in Shishou, in Hubei Province, rumors surrounding a young man’s mysterious death drew thousands into the streets, but a display of force cowed demonstrators, who ultimately retreated. Two recent incidents of unrest in Guiyang, in southwestern China — over a land dispute and employment — were quickly brought to a halt when officials, accompanied by police and security forces, dispersed the crowds. Little indicates that dialogue is preferred to repression. Indeed, some reports from Urumqi indicate that the demonstrations began peacefully, and much of the marauding occurred only after security troops appeared in large numbers.
Party cadres know that Beijing’s leadership is largely composed of officials who have not been shy about using force when protests emerged. For example, the crushing of dissent that took place in Beijing and Tibet in 1989 is seen by Chinese decision-makers and the cadres they sponsor as creating the conditions for economic reform. Party members seem to be keenly aware that that those who supported the crackdowns were quickly helicoptered into high-level positions.
Many Chinese officials are quite sophisticated in their responses to threats to their governance, and they are not tone-deaf to technology. Cellphone service and Internet access were both blocked within a few hours of the first demonstrations in Xinjiang. When word of the unrest cascaded out, much of the news was artfully managed by officials. Friends of mine in Beijing received unsolicited messages on their cellphones that provided the government version of the unrest. Government representatives handed out discs with pictures taken by state news organizations.
The state news media talked up the looting and burning of Han businesses but said nothing about attacks on Uighur establishments, and repeated mantras about stability and order. Rumors ran rampant in the run-up to these riots, but at the end of the day, bullets flew faster and struck harder than netizens’ bulletins.
The state apparatus has become dizzy with success in dealing with unrest. This gives little hope that further mass outbreaks will not be violently crushed. It also demonstrates that social upheaval will not pave the way to democracy. The party is too strong and confident to allow change from below.
Russell Leigh Moses is writing a book on the changing nature of power in China.
By RUSSELL LEIGH MOSES
Published: July 7, 2009
Beijing
THE riots in the Xinjiang region, the home of China’s Muslim Uighur minority, will affirm to many analysts outside the country that social unrest is a direct threat to the continued rule of the Communist Party. If officials don’t take a long, hard look at how to avoid such uprisings, this argument will run, the government could eventually fall.
If only Chinese officials saw things that way.
But even after at least 156 people have been reported dead in the city of Urumqi, many officials here see the recent violence — with Uighur rioters torching businesses owned by Han Chinese, China’s ethnic majority — as simple ingratitude.
A front-page editorial in the state-run People’s Daily described the protests as criminal actions by rioters, not as the manifestation of complaints of citizens angered by discriminatory policies. That view is already popular here in the capital. Few are surprised by the violence meted out by the state, and more than a few applaud it. A merchant in east Beijing expressed allegiance with his fellow Han entrepreneurs and, referring to the large outlays of aid to Xinjiang, asked of the Uighurs, “Where is their thanks for all the money we provide them?”
Both nationalistic fervor and the fear that instability might reverse the hard-won individual gains of economic reform combine to create more support for the government’s hard-line approach. Less discussed are the Uighurs’ real grievances: Beijing’s tight control over the practice of Islam; Han Chinese who migrate to Xinjiang and take the better jobs there; and the fact that ethnic minorities lack regular access to the government bureaucracy, where business in China is largely done.
Religious practice, local customs and educational choices in Xinjiang are controlled by the state to a draconian degree. Mosques are being repaired and modernized, but children have not been allowed to attend services. The follow-up demonstrations in Urumqi the day after the riots erupted took place outside mosques, testifying to the rallying cry of religion for a growing number of Chinese Muslims. These protests, too, were quickly broken up by local security forces.
Success breeds repetition, and the state always seems to win every contest with protesters — by cracking down, by persuading people to return to their homes, by imprisoning suspected ringleaders. Last month in Shishou, in Hubei Province, rumors surrounding a young man’s mysterious death drew thousands into the streets, but a display of force cowed demonstrators, who ultimately retreated. Two recent incidents of unrest in Guiyang, in southwestern China — over a land dispute and employment — were quickly brought to a halt when officials, accompanied by police and security forces, dispersed the crowds. Little indicates that dialogue is preferred to repression. Indeed, some reports from Urumqi indicate that the demonstrations began peacefully, and much of the marauding occurred only after security troops appeared in large numbers.
Party cadres know that Beijing’s leadership is largely composed of officials who have not been shy about using force when protests emerged. For example, the crushing of dissent that took place in Beijing and Tibet in 1989 is seen by Chinese decision-makers and the cadres they sponsor as creating the conditions for economic reform. Party members seem to be keenly aware that that those who supported the crackdowns were quickly helicoptered into high-level positions.
Many Chinese officials are quite sophisticated in their responses to threats to their governance, and they are not tone-deaf to technology. Cellphone service and Internet access were both blocked within a few hours of the first demonstrations in Xinjiang. When word of the unrest cascaded out, much of the news was artfully managed by officials. Friends of mine in Beijing received unsolicited messages on their cellphones that provided the government version of the unrest. Government representatives handed out discs with pictures taken by state news organizations.
The state news media talked up the looting and burning of Han businesses but said nothing about attacks on Uighur establishments, and repeated mantras about stability and order. Rumors ran rampant in the run-up to these riots, but at the end of the day, bullets flew faster and struck harder than netizens’ bulletins.
The state apparatus has become dizzy with success in dealing with unrest. This gives little hope that further mass outbreaks will not be violently crushed. It also demonstrates that social upheaval will not pave the way to democracy. The party is too strong and confident to allow change from below.
Russell Leigh Moses is writing a book on the changing nature of power in China.
